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LABOR LAw-EEOC CONCILIATION AGREEMENT-
ARBITRATION-JUDICIAL REVIEw-The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that an employer who breaches its collec-
tive bargaining agreement because of compliance with an Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission conciliation agreement will
not be shielded from liability by that agreement.
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union of Rubber
Workers, 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
A collective bargaining agreement existed between W.R. Grace
and Company, (Company), and Local Union 759, International
Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers
of America (Union), which expired in March of 1974; this agree-
ment contained seniority provisions relating to layoffs and shift
preferences and a clause requiring the parties to arbitrate griev-
ances.1 Because of failed negotiations, the Union called a strike
which began in March of 1974 and ended in May of 1974 with the
approval of a new agreement containing the same seniority and ar-
bitration provisions that had been in the prior agreement.2 During
the strike, the Company employed strike replacements who were
retained after the settlement of the strike and worked in conjunc-
tion with the regular employees.3
In October of 1973, prior to the March 1974 expiration of the
first collective bargaining agreement, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) invited the Company to conciliate
alleged discrimination by the Company in hiring of blacks and
women. Thus, the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement, which allegedly perpetuated the discrimination, were at
issue.4 The Company accepted the EEOC's invitation to concili-




4. Id. Conciliation, as practiced by the EEOC, means that the offending company, the
EEOC, and the union involved (if any) negotiate to reach a mutually satisfactory conclusion
wherein the EEOC standards are met with the least possible cost and inconvenience to the
company and the union. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2000f (1976) (the Civil Rights Act was enacted to assure equality of employment op-
portunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin).
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ate.6 The Union was also invited to participate in the conciliation
process but declined to do so.
After settlement of the strike in May of 1974, pursuant to its
negotiations with the EEOC, the Company allowed some women
strike replacements to retain positions ahead of regular male em-
ployees with more seniority.7 The Company also denied regular
male employees the right to exercise shift preference seniority over
the new female employees.' The men affected by these actions filed
grievances under the collective bargaining agreement requesting
arbitration. 9 The Company refused to arbitrate and sought an in-
junction in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Mississippi to prohibit arbitration of the employee griev-
ances while it was negotiating an agreement with the EEOC. 10 The
Union counterclaimed to compel arbitration."
Prior to a ruling by the district court, the Company and the
EEOC signed a conciliation agreement on December 11, 1974
which ratified and mandated the Company's treatment of the
women employees regarding seniority provisions and job place-
ment. 1 2 The Company then amended its complaint in the district
court action, adding the EEOC as a defendant and emphasizing
that the arbitration sought by the Union would violate the terms
of the conciliation agreement.'" The EEOC cross-claimed against
the Union and counterclaimed against the Company, seeking a de-
claratory judgment that the conciliation agreement prevailed over
the collective bargaining agreement provisions or, in the alterna-
tive, that the seniority provisions were not a bona fide seniority
system protected by section 703(h) of the Civil Rights Act.'4
While the dispute was still pending in district court, the Com-
pany laid off employees pursuant to the conciliation agreement,
some of whom would have been protected by the seniority provi-
sion of the collective bargaining agreement; these employees filed





10. Id. See also the decision of the district court W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l
Union of Rubber Workers, 403 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Miss. 1975).
11. 103 S. Ct. at 2180.
12. Id. See text accompanying notes 7-8.
13. 103 S. Ct. at 2180.
14. Id. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976).
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grievances." In November of 1975, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the EEOC and the Company."'
Upon appeal by the Union, the decision was reversed by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the Com-
pany was compelled to arbitrate.17 While the appeal was pending,
the Company laid off more male employees pursuant to the concili-
ation agreement. Those male employees then filed grievances.18
As a result of the decision by the court of appeals, the Company
reinstated the laid off employees to the positions to which the col-
lective bargaining agreement entitled them.19 The employee griev-
ances seeking back pay proceeded to arbitration.20 In August of
1978, the first of these grievances, that of a male employee who
was demoted while the district court order was in effect, was
brought before Arbitrator Anthony J. Sabella, who denied the
grievance.21
The next employee grievances to reach arbitration were those of
three male employees who had been laid off, two after and one
before the district court order.22 Arbitrator Gerald A. Barrett held
for the employees, finding that the collective bargaining agreement
made no exceptions for good faith violations of the seniority provi-
sions and the district court's order did not relieve the Company of
liability for its breach.2 8
The Company then filed an action in federal district court to
reverse Barrett's arbitration award.24 The district court granted
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2181.
16. Id. The district court held that the seniority provisions could be modified under
Title VII to correct past discrimination and that the conciliation agreement was binding
upon all parties. Id.
17. Id. The court of appeals held that because the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement were not enacted for a discriminatory purpose, they were lawful and,
therefore, could not be changed without the Union's consent. Id. See W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 565 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2181.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Although Sabella felt that the employee was entitled to prevail under the col-
lective bargaining agreement, he felt it unfair to penalize the Company for conduct con-
forming to a court order. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2181-82. Barrett concluded that the collective bargaining agreement did not
require him to follow the Sabella arbitration decision as the agreement specifically limits the
arbitrator's authority to considering if the express terms of the contract have been violated
and Sabella had exceeded the scope of his authority in considering the fairness of enforcing
the agreement. Id.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2182.
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summary judgment for the Company stating that public policy
prevented enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement dur-
ing the period prior to the court of appeals' reversal." The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed" and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
2 7
Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that
the only issue to be decided was the validity of upholding the Bar-
rett arbitration award. Justice Blackmun noted that a court may
not review the merits of an arbitration award unless the arbitrator
went beyond the scope of the authority given him by the collective
bargaining agreement.29 If the arbitrator's decision "draws its es-
sence from the collective bargaining agreement" it must be en-
forced, even if the arbitrator's basis for decision seems ambigu-
ous.30 Therefore, the enforcement of the Barrett award by the
court of appeals was correct."'
Barrett's decision that he was not bound to follow Sabella was
based upon his own interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement, which clearly gave Barrett the right to such interpreta-
tion.3 2 On the merits, Barrett had found that the collective bar-
gaining agreement gave him no authority to excuse a breach of the
seniority provisions based upon a good faith defense.3 Therefore,
Justice Blackmun emphasized that since Barrett's exercise of
power was proper under the contract, the court must uphold the
25. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 403 F. Supp. 1183
(N.D. Miss. 1975). The public policy recognized by the district court is the enforcement of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at 1188.
26. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 652 F.2d 1248 (5th
Cir. 1981).
27. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, Int'l Union of Rubber Workers, 102 S. Ct. 3481
(1982).
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2182.
29. Id. Thus, the court's opinion of the arbitrator's reasoning is not at issue. See Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2182.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2183. The 1974 and 1977 collective bargaining agreements both defined the
parameters of the arbitrator's jurisdiction as follows:
The jurisdiction and authority of the Arbitrator of the grievance and his opinion and
award shall be confined exclusively to the interpretation and application of the ex-
press provision or provisions of this Agreement at issue between the Union and the
Company. He shall have no authority to add to, adjust, change, or modify any provi-
sions of this Agreement. Art. IV, § 3; App. 19, 31. The decisions of the Arbitrator on
the merits of any grievance adjudicated within his jurisdiction and authority as speci-
fied in this Agreement shall be final and binding on the aggrieved employee or em-
ployees, the Union and the Company. Art. IV, § 4; App. 20, 32.
33. Id. See supra note 23 and accompanying text and note 32 and accompanying text.
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award unless it was contrary to some explicit, well-defined public
policy.34 Barrett's interpretation of his own authority under the
collective bargaining agreement precluded his consideration of
public policy but, in any event, the court is the proper forum in
which to resolve policy considerations."
While observing that obedience to judicial orders is an important
public policy, 6 Justice Blackmun explained that enforcement of
the collective bargaining agreement as interpreted by Barrett
would not violate that policy. 37 Barrett's award did not order the
Company to place the affected male workers in their original posi-
tions, thus preventing the Company from complying with the
EEOC agreement; it simply ordered the Company to pay damages
for its breach of the collective bargaining agreement.3 8 Justice
Blackmun emphasized that since the Company voluntarily com-
mitted itself to two conflicting contracts, the Company, not the
workers, should bear the loss of those conflicting obligations. 3' Jus-
tice Blackmun declared that economic loss from discrimination
against blacks and women was bound to fall upon some party and
because the Company perpetrated the discrimination, it should not
be permitted to shift the loss to the employees.'0
The Court then addressed the question of whether the impor-
tant public policy of encouraging voluntary compliance with Title
VII would be adversely affected by enforcing the Barrett order,
concluding that it would not."1 The conciliation agreement was
signed by the Company and the EEOC but not by the Union;
therefore, the agreement could not alter the collective bargaining
34. 103 S. Ct. at 2183. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948). See infra note 89.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2183. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Washington Employers,
Inc., 557 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977); Local 453 v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d
Cir. 1963) (in each case the court reiterated the position that courts are the proper forum in
which to resolve questions of public policy). Justice Blackmun noted that, to be valid, a
public policy must be clear, well-defined and ascertainable from law and legal precedents,
rather than inferred from general considerations of public interest. 103 S. Ct. at 2183.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 2184. When a court acting within its jurisdiction issues an injunction,
it must be obeyed until the injunction is vacated or withdrawn. See Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1967).
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2184.
38. Id. at 2184-85.
39. Id. Impossibility caused by a judicial order prohibiting performance will excuse a
party's performance only if the fault of the party owing performance did not contribute to
the order. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1975).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2186.
41. Id. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (the Court stated
that voluntary compliance is the preferred means of enforcing Title VII where a black em-
ployee claimed his discharge resulted from racial discrimination).
10371984
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agreement, as the Union was not a party to it.42 The Court hypoth-
esized that if such an alteration of a collective bargaining agree-
ment were upheld, chaos would ensue in federal labor policy as
companies and unions could never be sure that their agreements
had not been altered without their consent.43 The Court concluded
that upholding the Barrett order would actually serve to promote
the public policy of voluntary compliance with Title VII as the
Union might offer to sign the conciliation agreement in exchange
for other concessions by the Company; thus, all parties involved,
the Company, the Union and the EEOC, would be working to-
gether to achieve compliance with Title VII.44 The judgment of the
court of appeals was therefore affirmed.4
The nature of arbitration itself imposes a limit on the extent to
which it may be reviewed by the courts." Arbitration is a volun-
tary proceeding in which an impartial judge determines the out-
come of a dispute. The judge, who has been selected by both par-
ties, makes a decision that will be accepted as final and binding in
accordance with the parties' advance agreement.47 Arbitration is
one of the oldest methods of settling disputes, dating back to Ro-
man law, and the debate regarding judicial review of arbitral
awards is as old as arbitration itself.48 Because of the wide use of
arbitration today, especially in labor agreements, it is important to
examine the parameters of the courts' power in reviewing arbitra-
tors' awards.4 '
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Ala-
42. 103 S. Ct. at 2184.
43. Id. at 2186. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 509 (1962) (an
employer refused to honor an agreement reached by its representatives and the Union,
claiming its representatives lacked authority to make such an agreement and that the Union
had knowledge of this lack of authority).
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2186.
45. Id.
46. Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 519,
521 (1960). If courts were given unlimited powers of review over arbitration decisions, the
arbitration process would lose its finality thereby losing its expediency and economy. Id.
47. ELKOURI, How ARBIrrRATION WORKS 2 (1952).
48. Id. at 519.
49. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 275 (1980). In certain areas such as labor agreements, arbitration is
much more effective at resolving disputes than the courts. Besides the obvious advantages of
cost and time, arbitration provides the parties to a dispute with other advantages unavaila-
ble in court. The parties define the rules by which disputes will be settled in their contracts
and name the arbitrator who will settle the dispute. In selecting the arbitrator, the parties
may choose someone with knowledge of customs, practices and conditions of the industry,
knowledge that a judge would certainly lack. Id.
1038 Vol. 22:1033
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bama,5° the Supreme Court first announced that an agreement to
arbitrate would be specifically enforced by federal courts.8 1 That
landmark decision was followed by three cases involving the
United Steelworkers of America, all decided on June 20, 1960,
which did much to define the proper role of the courts regarding
arbitration decisions. 2
In United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co.,as the
Court emphasized that when a collective bargaining agreement ex-
ists between the parties which provides for settlement of disputes
by arbitration, courts have no right to review the merits of a griev-
ance.54 The agreement in American Manufacturing Co. provided
that the arbitrator resolve all disputes between the parties "as to
the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of
the agreement." 8 Thus, it was the arbitrator's construction that
was bargained for, not that of the court, so the court had no right
to overrule the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement."
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,5 7 the
majority stated that if courts had the final word on the merits of
arbitration awards, the federal policy of promoting industrial sta-
bilization through collective bargaining agreements would be un-
dermined." It was noted that if courts are permitted to review the
50. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). An employer and a union had a collective bargaining agree-
ment which provided that there would be no strikes or work stoppages and that grievances
would be handled by arbitration. A grievance arose and the company refused to arbitrate.
Id. at 449.
51. Id. at 451. In Lincoln Mills, the Court held that a court must apply federal sub-
stantive law derived from the policy of national labor laws. Id. at 456.
52. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (union brought a
suit under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel arbitration of
an employee's grievance based on seniority provisions of the contract); United Steelworkers
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (union brought a suit under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act to compel arbitration of a grievance based
upon employer's practice of contracting out work while laying off employees who could have
performed such work); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960) (employees were discharged during the term of a collective bargaining agreement
containing a provision for arbitration of disputes, but arbitration proceeding itself occurred
after the agreement had expired).
53. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
54. Id. at 568. The Court stated: "When the judiciary undertakes to determine the
merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the grievance procedure of collective
bargaining agreements, it usurps a function which under that regime is entrusted to the
arbitration tribunal." Id. at 569.
55. Id. at 565.
56. Id. at 568.
57. 363 U.S. 574 (1960). See supra note 52.
58. Id. at 578.
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merits of an arbitrator's decision, they usurp the power of the arbi-
trator, who is an indispensible agency in a continuous collective
bargaining process. The majority further stated that an arbitrator
may settle disputes at the plant level using the knowledge of cus-
toms and practices of a particular industry, which a judge may not
possess." Therefore, an order to arbitrate a grievance should be
made unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbi-
tration clause is not susceptible in an interpretation that embraces
the asserted dispute. Thus, only the most definite evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail.6 0
In United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.," an
arbitrator found that a group of employees had been improperly
discharged and ordered the company to reinstate them with back
pay.62 Before the arbitrator's decision, however, the collective bar-
gaining agreement had expired. The arbitrator claimed that the ex-
piration of the agreement did not affect the validity of his award,
but the company disagreed. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the Company and reversed the arbitrator's
award." The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the arbitrator's
award, finding that the lower court merely disagreed with the arbi-
trator's interpretation of the agreement." The Court made its de-
termination on the parameters of an arbitrator's decision, stating:
... an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of in-
dustrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet
his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. [Only] when the arbitrator's words manifest an
infidelity to this obligation [do] courts have no choice but to refuse enforce-
59. Id. at 582. The Court observed: "The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance, because he
cannot be similarly informed." Id. at 582.
60. Id. at 582-85.
61. 363 U.S. 593 (1960). A group of employees was fired for a work stoppage protesting
the firing of another employee. The collective bargaining agreement provided that the arbi-
trator decide "the meaning and application of the agreement" with his decision final and
binding on the parties. Id. at 594-95.
62. Id. at 595. The arbitrator awarded the employees full back pay except for a period
of ten days suspension, which he felt was sufficient punishment for their improper conduct.
Id.
63. Id.
64. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959)
(the circuit court held for the company stating that the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement did not control because the agreement had expired).
65. 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
1040 Vol. 22:1033
Recent Decisions
ment of the award.6
Relying on these parameters, the Supreme Court upheld the arbi-
trator's decision even though it was somewhat ambiguous, stating
that "[a] mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award,
which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded
his authority, is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award."
'67
Thus, only a definite showing that the arbitrator's decision does
not "draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"
was found to justify a court's overruling it.
The general rule, articulated by the Court in the Steelworkers'
cases, that courts may not review the merits of an arbitrator's
award, is theoretically unquestioned today." In practice, however,
some lower courts have ignored the rule and indeed reviewed the
merits of certain cases. 9 In Mistletoe Express Service v. Motor
Expressmen's Union,70 the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
refused to enforce an award mandating discipline but not dis-
charge of a party who committed an infraction specified in the
agreement as one warranting discharge.7 1 The court reviewed the
merits of the case, concluding that the agreement was unambigu-
ous and the arbitrator went beyond his authority in basing his de-
cision on the employer's past uneven enforcement and failure to
use progressive discipline.72 Similarly, in Textile Workers Union v.
American Thread Co.,73 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit refused to enforce an arbitrator's decision that a grievant be
disciplined and not discharged.7 4 The court observed that the col-
lective bargaining agreement gave the employer the right to disci-
pline or discharge an employee for "just cause" and that the arbi-
trator had exceeded his authority in differentiating between "just
cause" needed for discharge and "just cause" needed for
discipline.7
It has been noted that the importance of these and other exam-
66. Id. at 597.
67. Id. at 598.
68. Kaden, supra note 49, at 270.
69. Id. at 270-72. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
70. 566 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1977).
71. Id. at 695.
72. Id.
73. 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir. 1961).
74. Id. at 899-901.
75. Id. See also Truck Drivers Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.
1964) (the court concluded that the arbitrator lacked authority to measure the degree of
discipline warranted by an infraction).
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pies of judicial intervention into the merits of an arbitrator's deci-
sion lies not so much in the judicial instinct to intervene and cor-
rect a latent injustice, as in the judicial instinct to distrust the
finality of a collective bargaining agreement." Labor agreements
are seen as having such a profound social and economic effect on
our country that some judges fear placing their interpretation in
the hands of laymen. In addition, the generality of the standard for
upholding an arbitrator's decision-whether the award draws its
essence from the agreement-gives a judge great latitude in inter-
preting an award as outside of the essence of the agreement if he
disagrees with the award."
A particularly troublesome concern of judges in reviewing arbi-
tration awards is how public law should affect the awards. In Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,78 the Supreme Court held that an
arbitration award does not act to foreclose an employee from
bringing a discrimination claim before the EEOC or the courts.79
The court found that the Civil Rights Act embodies too important
a national policy to force a party to choose between a statutory
remedy and a contractual remedy. 0
Sometimes parties to a collective bargaining agreement will di-
rect the arbitrator to consider law which is pertinent to the agree-
ment; in such circumstances, the arbitrator clearly has the author-
ity to consider law. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Local 117 v. Washington Employers, Inc.,"1 the court found no
merit in the employer's argument that the arbitrator had exceeded
his authority by looking beyond the scope of the agreement to
state law when the parties had requested and stipulated that he do
SO.e8
When the parties give the arbitrator no power to look to the law
76. Kaden, supra note 49, at 274.
77. Id. at 276.
78. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (a black employee claimed that his discharge resulted from
racial discrimination).
79. Id. at 60.
80. Id. at 44-60. The Court stated:
We think, therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommo-
dated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the griev-
ance-arbitration clause of a collective-bargaining agreement and his cause of action
under Title V11.
Id. at 59-60.
81. 557 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 1350.
1042 Vol. 22:1033
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in resolving disputes, the arbitrator is in a precarious position.83 If
he applies the law to the dispute, he risks a judicial determination
that he acted beyond the scope of his authority; however, if he ig-
nores the law, staying within the bounds of his authority, the arbi-
trator risks being reversed by the Court." Some legal scholars, in-
cluding Lewis B. Kaden,85 advise that in the absence of manifest
illegality, the arbitrator should decide grievances based solely on
the contract, leaving legal issues to be resolved by the courts.86
Moreover, as the W.R. Grace & Co. Court stated, legal issues
such as the public policy regarding an arbitration award are to be
evaluated by the courts, not by an arbitrator.87 To be judicially
valid, a public policy must be definite." If a valid public policy
does exist, a court is compelled to consider it before enforcing an
arbitration award.89
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 90 the Court concluded that
Congress intended cooperation and voluntary compliance to be the
preferred means of enforcing Title VII.9 1 The Alexander Court
found that this preferred means of enforcement constituted a valid
public policy consideration as expressed in legal precedent.92 Fur-
ther, Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney," the Court recognized
the validity of the Federal labor policy of industrial and economic
83. Kaden, supra note 49, at 287.
84. Id. See Telephone Workers Local 827 v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 584 F.2d 31 (3d
Cir. 1978) (arbitrator's award was overruled because it conflicted with the law, yet the arbi-
trator was commended for staying within the bounds of his authority).
85. Louis B. Kaden is a Professor of Law at Columbia University; B.A. 1963, LL. B.
1967, Harvard University.
86. Kaden, supra note 49, at 289.
87. Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 943 (1963); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Washington Em-
ployers, Inc., 557 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977). See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
88. See Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 (1945). In Muschany, the Court
stated: "Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and
not from general considerations of supposed public interests." Id. at 66.
89. See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The Court observed:
The power of the federal courts to enforce the terms of private agreements is at all
times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of the public policy of the
United States as manifested in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes, and appli-
cable legal precedents. Where the enforcement of private agreements would be viola-
tive of that policy, it is the obligation of courts to refrain from such exertions of
judicial power.
Id. at 34-35.
90. 415 U.S. 36 (1973).
91. Id. at 44. The court relied on congressional intent as explicated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
92. 415 U.S. at 44.
93. 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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stability, and reiterated the position that this policy should be ov-
served when a court reviews an arbitration award.9 '
Within this historical framework, it is evident that Justice
Blackmun in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, International Union
of Rubber Workers9 followed both the substantive law and judicial
policy in determining that the Barrett award should be enforced.
The cases examined above9 6 assert a rule of law that is respected
by courts today: courts have no right to review the merits of a
grievance where a collective bargaining agreement exists between
the parties which mandates arbitration.97
As legal, social, and economic problems become more complex in
society in general, and in the area of labor relations specifically,
the laws and policies governing arbitration itself and judicial re-
view of arbitration must be crystalized if arbitration is to provide
the expediency, finality and economy for which it was designed. A
delicate balance must be reached wherein the arbitrator, who has
industrial expertise and mutual consent of the parties, is respected
in his decisions as long as they are based upon the agreement, and
the judge, who has legal expertise and authority, is respected in his
decisions regarding public policy issues involved in the arbitration
award.
Through an awareness of the proper parameters of the roles of
judges and arbitrators, courts may reach that elusive balance of
authority which is important for the future effectiveness of arbitra-
tion. Arbitration, properly conceived and implemented, has the ca-
pacity to become a keystone in a new streamlined foundation of
labor relations based upon stability, efficiency and cooperation,
that is so necessary to economic revitalization in the 1980's.
John V. Pecori
94. Id. at 509. The Court stated that parties to a collective bargaining agreement must
have reasonable certainty that the provisions of their contracts will be honored or nation-
wide industrial anarchy might result. Id.
95. 103 S. Ct. 2177 (1983).
96. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
97. See supra note 96.
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